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The politics of global assessments: the case of the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) 
 
Ian Scoones 
 
 
The IAASTD – the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development – which ran between 2003 and 2008, involving over 
400 scientists worldwide, was an ambitious attempt to encourage local and global 
debate on the future of agricultural science and technology. Responding to critiques 
of top-down, northern-dominated expert assessments of the past, the IAASTD aimed 
to be more inclusive and participatory in both design and process. But to what extent 
did it meet these objectives? Did it genuinely allow alternative voices to be heard? 
Did it create a new mode of engagement in global arenas? And what were the power 
relations involved, creating what processes of inclusion and exclusion? These 
questions are probed in an examination of the IAASTD process over five years, 
involving a combination of interviews with key participants and review of available 
documents. The paper focuses in particular on two areas of controversy – the use of 
quantitative scenario modelling and the role of genetically-modified crops in 
developing country agriculture. These highlight some of the knowledge contests 
involved in the assessment and, in turn, illuminate four questions at the heart of 
contemporary democratic theory and practice: how do processes of knowledge 
framing occur; how do different practices and methodologies get deployed in cross-
cultural, global processes; how is ‘representation’ constructed and legitimised; and 
how, as a result, do collective understandings of global issues emerge? The paper 
concludes that, in assessments of this sort, the politics of knowledge needs to be made 
more explicit, and negotiations around politics and values, framings and perspectives, 
need to be put centre-stage in assessment design. 
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Introduction 
Global assessments have become all the rage. The International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) is one 
of many, coming on the back of the IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change), 
the MA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment), the World Commission on Dams, the 
Millennium Project’s Millennium Development Goal Task Forces, among others. The 
IPCC even won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, the first assessment to do so.
1
 All of 
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 these attempt to combine ‘expert assessment’ with processes of ‘stakeholder 
consultation’, in what are presented as global, participatory assessments on key issues 
of major international importance. Such assessments contribute to a new landscape of 
governance in the international arena, offering the potential for links between the 
local and the global, and present ways of articulating citizen engagement with global 
processes of decision-making and policy. For some these are new regimes of 
governance, defining new relationships for international politics (Miller 2007, 
Mitchell et al. 2006).  In many respects such assessments respond to the critiques of 
the top-down, northern-dominated, expert assessments of the past and make attempts 
to be both more inclusive and participatory in their design and process, offering new 
opportunities for mobilisation and the articulation of alternative knowledges in the 
global policy domain. But to what extent do they meet these objectives? Do they 
genuinely allow alternative voices to be heard? Do they create a new mode of 
engagement in global arenas? How do local and global processes articulate? And what 
are the power relations involved, creating what processes of mediation, inclusion, and 
exclusion? 
 Taking the case of the IAASTD, this paper explores these issues through a focus 
on the underlying knowledge politics of a global process. Four intersecting questions, 
at the heart of contemporary democratic theory and practice, are posed: how do 
processes of knowledge framing occur; how do different practices and methodologies 
get deployed in cross-cultural, global processes; how is ‘representation’ constructed 
and legitimised; and how, as a result, do collective understandings of global issues 
emerge? Drawing on a detailed analysis of the IAASTD process between 2003 and 
2008, the paper argues that in such assessments the politics of knowledge need to be 
made more explicit, and that negotiations around politics and values must be put 
centre-stage. The black-boxing of uncertainty, or the eclipsing of more fundamental 
clashes over interpretation and meaning, must be avoided in order for processes of 
participation and engagement in global assessment processes to become more 
meaningful, democratic and accountable. Following Mouffe (2005), the paper offers a 
critique of simplistic forms of deliberative democratic practice, and argues there is a 
need to ‘bring politics back in’. 
 
The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology (IAASTD) 
The overall purpose of the IAASTD, which concluded with a final plenary session in 
Johannesburg in April 2008 and the publication of the final reports in 2009 (IAASTD 
2009a), was ‘to assess agricultural knowledge, science and technology in order to use 
it more effectively to reduce hunger and poverty, improve rural livelihoods, and 
facilitate equitable, environmentally, socially and economically sustainable 
development’.2 No one could argue with that of course. But how was this ambitious 
aim to be realised? 
 The IAASTD was announced during 2002, and was initiated on five continents in 
early 2003 with a series of consultation meetings. Since then five regional reports and 
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 one global report were produced, all contributing to a synthesis and summaries for 
decision-makers for each continental and the global report. A total of 400 authors 
were recruited to write the reports, and an overall framework was hammered out in a 
series of meetings,
3
 a process overseen by a complex governance structure (Scoones 
2008). 
 This process has been overseen by a complex governance structure. According to 
the IAASTD website (www.agassessment.org): 
 
The IAASTD has an inter-governmental governance structure, which 
resembles that of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), but 
contains a Bureau similar to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) 
Board of Directors. The geographically based multi-stakeholder Bureau is, 
comprised of 30 government representatives [Sub-Saharan Africa (6); Latin 
America and the Caribbean (5); Central and West Asia and North Africa (4); 
North America and Europe (9); and East and South Asia and the Pacific (6)], 
22 representatives from civil society [the private sector (6); non-governmental 
organizations (6); consumer groups (4); and producer groups (6)], 
representatives from 8 institutions, and 2 co-chairs. The co-sponsoring 
agencies serve as ex-officio members of the Bureau. The Plenary (i.e. the 
Panel of participating governments) elected the government representatives of 
the Bureau, with each region selecting its own members, taking into account 
areas of expertise and gender balance. Decisions are taken by the panel of 
participating governments and the Bureau, where appropriate. The Plenary is 
comprised of representatives from the member states of the 7 co-sponsoring 
agencies. At the first Plenary, the governments approved the scope, goals, 
structure (global and sub-global assessments), governance and management 
structures, budget and timetable for the IAASTD. At the conclusion of the 
IAASTD process, the Panel will be responsible for accepting the Full Report 
and for subjecting the Global and Sub-Global Summaries for Decision Makers 
to a final line-by-line approval in a session of the Plenary. The IAASTD has a 
distributed Secretariat with the major component being in Washington DC and 
other components in FAO (Rome), UNEP (Nairobi), and UNESCO (Paris). 
The Secretariat provides management and oversight of the project, as well as 
liaising with governments, civil society organizations and the Bureau to ensure 
project implementation. Other members of the distributed Secretariat include 
staff located at the Sub-global Management Entities. The intergovernmental 
process ensures ownership by governments, while the integrated Bureau 
allows the full range of stakeholders to meet as a single body creating 
opportunities for constructive exchanges and building consensus. (IAASTD 
2009b) 
 
 A key role was played by the Secretariat, and particularly the co-chairs. They had 
to guide, cajole and facilitate the process. This was a major learning process, and one 
that involved some difficult decisions being taken. According to informants, heated 
debates took place over overall scope, framing, and what was an acceptable 
contribution from the beginning. The assessment overall was directed by Robert 
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 Watson (formerly Chief Science Advisor at the World Bank, now Chief Scientific 
Advisor at the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). He has 
been the inspiration and driver behind the assessment, bringing his experience from 
the IPCC and MA to bear on this enterprise. Originally from the UK, and a chemist by 
training, he has had a high profile career at the forefront of science policy, particularly 
in the US, where he was an adviser to the Clinton administration.
4
 The co-chairs of 
the assessment are Kenyan Judi Wakhungu, director of the African Centre for 
Technology Studies in Nairobi, a geologist by original training and formerly 
Associate Professor of Science, Technology and Society at Pennsylvania State 
University  and Swiss-born entomologist and World Food Prize winner, Hans Herren, 
who was director of the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology 
(ICIPE) in Nairobi, Kenya from 1994 to 2005, and has since become the President of 
the Millennium Institute in Arlington, Virginia.
5
 
 The IAASTD had very substantial financial backing from a wide range of bilateral 
donors, UN organisations, and the World Bank, with a total budget of over US$15m.
6
 
With agriculture and technology rising up the development agenda again, many 
agencies saw this as an excellent opportunity to map out a way forward. A 
combination of a multi-stakeholder and an inter-governmental UN process appealed, 
as this offered the combination of inclusion and dialogue, including civil society and 
private business actors, as well as formal decision-making and buy-in by nation states. 
Was this perhaps the model for the future – picking the best of the IPCC and the MA 
and combining them in an approach to global decision-making that was at once 
scientifically sound, politically legitimate, and participatory? 
 A number of unique attributes are highlighted by the director, Robert Watson, 
including an advisory structure which encompasses governmental representatives as 
well as civil society; the ‘inclusion of hundreds of experts from all relevant 
stakeholder groups’; an ‘intellectually consistent framework’; a global, multi-scale 
and long term approach, resulting in ‘plausible scenarios’ to 2050; the ‘integration of 
local and institutional knowledge’; and a multi-thematic approach, encompassing 
nutrition, livelihoods, and human health, linking science and technology issues to 
policies and institutions.
7
 As a multi-stakeholder process involving everyone from 
grassroots groups to scientists and representatives of large corporations, with the final 
product being signed by national governments, there has to date been no parallel. As 
such it provides fascinating insights into processes of participation and global 
engagement, and the implications this has for the contestation of global knowledge 
and the construction of global citizenship. 
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 Tracing the local and the global: shifting spaces for rural citizen engagement 
In tracing the linkages from the local to the global, some qualifications of these terms 
must be added up front. This shorthand can, as the paper will show, be potentially 
misleading. In discussions around the IAASTD, ‘the local’ is sometimes described in 
terms of the assessment regions, demarcating sub-Saharan Africa, a massive, diverse 
continent, as ‘local’. The term ‘local’ is often used to conjure up reference to ‘local 
people’ or ‘local – or indigenous - knowledge’, often referring to poorer people that 
NGOs have worked with in the field, rather than the ‘local’ sites in Washington, 
Rome ,or London, and their own very particular, culturally-located indigenous 
knowledges. Discussions with different people thus present ‘the local’ in very 
different ways, highlighting the contested nature of the term.  
 But, whatever the interpretation, ‘the local’ is of course always mediated and 
subject to fluid interpretations. In certain strands of NGO discourse, it is seen to 
represent the good, more progressive alternative, in contrast to the perceived problems 
with global, modern, and western versions. Thus, ‘the local’ is constructed in 
opposition to ‘the global’, but with a definite ideological and political complexion.  In 
the same way, ‘the global’ is seen in different ways. For some it is simply 
international – issues that cut across nation states; yet for others it represents a 
particular form of (globalised) capitalist relationship, most associated with North 
America and Europe. For some involved in the IAASTD, the global was thought 
about as the centre – the location of the secretariat and decision-making with a 
Washington DC address. This ‘centre of calculation’ (cf. Latour 1987) is seen by 
some as the hub of the networks of knowledge and power around which other 
perspectives must revolve.  
 Thus in tracing global and local linkages all these versions – and more – must be 
taken account of. This is not just a geographical tracing (from particular places to the 
world), or one of levels (from the small-scale to the large), but one of social 
relationships (from the less connected/networked to the more), interconnectedness, 
power, and politics (from less to more powerful and influential). This, in turn, 
presents some important methodological and interpretive challenges. What follows is 
based on a number of sources, including around 30 interviews with IAASTD 
participants, detailed analyses of the available documentation on the IAASTD and 
related websites, including each of the drafts of the reports, along with all reports 
from the consultation meetings, as well as numerous presentations and supplementary 
papers prepared for these.
8
 In particular the analysis has sought to gain insights into 
the overall ‘narratives’ and ‘framings’ of the assessment – what stories are being told 
and what assumptions are embedded in the statements being made? And what, indeed, 
are the stories that are not being told, or are being side-lined, discredited, or obscured? 
 The IAASTD, as with the other global assessments, is seen by its proponents as a 
brave attempt at engaging a diverse group of stakeholders on a key topic with major 
global ramifications. In this regard it is a major departure from previous models of 
global expert decision-making, where attempts at dialogue and debate were largely 
absent and processes were open only to an exclusive, expert elite. In this way, the 
IAASTD chimes with a central theme of the more optimistic strands of the literature 
on globalisation and civil society. These suggest that, with the opening up of 
opportunities for engagement at the global level, and the increasing connections 
between local level actors and issues and those in global arenas, the opportunities for 
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 participation and influence increases through a ‘global civil society’ (Edwards and 
Gaventa 2001, Keane 2003, Archibugi 2008). With this opening up, processes 
become more complex and require increasingly sophisticated forms of mobilisation 
by activists and movements in order to engage (Tarrow 1994). But the net result is a 
pluralisation of knowledges, claims and inputs into cosmopolitan global contexts, 
resulting, it is argued, ultimately in a more democratic and accountable system of 
governance and policy-making (Held and McGrew 2002, Heater 2002).  
 The IAASTD could be seen as one avenue for such new styles of engagement, 
knowledge production and claim making; and indeed the rhetoric associated with it 
suggests that this is in part the wider aim. A vision of cosmopolitan diversity and 
democratic decision-making is portrayed, governed by rules and procedures allowing 
rational decisions and objective science to prevail. A closer look at the processes and 
practices of the IAASTD, however, reveals some major limits to such a vision. In 
particular it highlights, following Fischer (2000), the important contemporary tensions 
between professional expertise and democratic governance, and, as Jasanoff and 
Martello (2004, 5) argue, that, with the of reassertion of local knowledge claims in 
global environmental processes, ‘the construction of both the local and the global 
crucially depends on the production of knowledge and its interactions with power’. 
Tracing these knowledge-power interactions is thus central to any understanding of 
local-global engagements. The aim of this paper to go beyond the well-rehearsed 
rhetoric of participation, inclusion, and citizen engagement and ask what have been 
the practice, experience, and underlying politics of the IAASTD?  
 In order to explore these questions, the paper now turns to two areas where 
substantial debate emerged: the use of scenarios to define alternative possible futures 
and the role of genetically-modified (GM) crops. 
 
Framing the future: the use of scenario modelling 
Different scenarios of ‘plausible futures’ had been used extensively in the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment which was undertaken between 2001 and 2005, again under 
the leadership of Robert Watson. The MA offered four scenarios of the future – 
Global Orchestration, Order from Strength, Techno-garden and Adapting Mosaic
9
 – 
around which possible options and trade-offs were constructed. A number of those 
involved in the MA, including Watson, had thought that this approach had allowed a 
searching analysis of alternatives, opening up alternative thinking and bringing 
together natural and social science perspectives in an overall assessment. For these 
reasons, the use of scenarios was seen as a central tool for the IAASTD from its 
inception.  
 A number of key players in the IAASTD thought the scenarios work could, in this 
case, be taken a step further including a more quantitative assessment of options. 
Making use of the quantitative models developed by IFPRI, notably the IMPACT 
(International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade) 
model looking at the impact of different agricultural development options (Rosegrant 
et al. 2001), the idea was to extend the MA approach and ground it in some hard 
numbers. With this in mind Mark Rosegrant from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI, one of the CGIAR Centres based in Washington DC) and 
colleagues from the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation in Rome were drafted in 
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 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Guide to the Millennium Assessment Reports, 
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 to come up with some ideas, and funds from the Australian government were made 
available explicitly for this work. 
 At the Rome meeting in 2005, Rosegrant, together with FAO colleagues Monica 
Zurek and Prabhu Pingali, laid out his ideas in a series of powerpoint presentations.
10
 
This took the four MA scenarios and showed how options could be evaluated using 
the IMPACT model and data from each of the IAASTD assessment regions. It was an 
ambitious vision, one led by a technical, quantitative framework which defined limits 
and possibilities. At the Bangkok meeting of May 2006, the IAASTD Scenario 
Working Group reported on progress, proposing a series of chapters of the final report 
on the scenario work. These defined in turn a framework (involving drivers, plausible 
futures, and models), a series of storylines to 2050, and an analysis of scenario 
outputs.
11
  
 As a core part of both the global and regional reports, the scenarios work became 
hotly debated from the beginning. Many feared that the scenarios, and particularly 
their quantitative incarnations, were narrowing the framing of the assessment, 
excluding other alternatives through the assumptions being made in the process. The 
scenario group was heavily dominated by the IFPRI modelling expertise, but others 
found the approach intimidating and exclusive, so dense and complex were the 
models that underlay the computer runs. Indeed, the peer reviews of the scenarios 
work were heavily critical. One participant (personal communication, August 2008) 
commented, 
 
Many of us considered that in any truly ‘scientific’ assessment, the IFPRI 
models would not have been used at all, given the technical weaknesses 
identified, and given that there are more advanced models available that are 
better able to handle distributional impacts, gendered impacts, and energy 
flows/ecosystem service issues; and that do not rest on outmoded assumptions 
of neo-equilibrium economics . . . and so on. 
 
All regional groups were expected to engage with the scenarios work, but this proved 
difficult for the Africa group as it was deemed that only those with certain expertise 
should get involved. As a consequence the role of the scenarios in the Africa work 
became highly contentious. As one author observed,  
 
In the Africa group we had intensive debate about the scenarios. Where did 
they come from? Did they apply to our contexts? Many of us did not like 
them, but the process imposed them. We had our own scenarios group, but 
there are not many of us who have expertise in doing scenarios so it was run 
by the Washington group.
12
 
 
 For others among the NGO/civil society groups, the whole process was geared to 
exclude their perspectives and alternatives. Benny Haerlin, the Greenpeace 
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 representative on the Bureau, commented in a note from the Montpellier meeting in 
2005 posted on the NGO website tracking the process: 
 
In addition to our ongoing criticism of the ambiguous character of this 
scenario exercise (between science, fiction and dire presentation of political 
assumptions as scientific findings) working on the further development of the 
scenarios seems to be one of the big challenges for NGOs in this context . . . 
(Haerlin 2005) 
 
 The critique of the scenarios work continued, although the group continued to 
operate. By the time of the Bangkok meeting in 2006, the scenario names had 
changed, but not a lot else. Mapping on to the MA scenarios, the four scenarios were 
now: policy and markets (global orchestration), local learning (adapting mosaic), 
green technologies (techno-garden), and self sufficiency/sovereign interest (order 
from strength). The IMPACT and IMAGE models were used in particular to run some 
of the quantitative analyses, but many remained unimpressed by the computer 
wizardry. 
 The Greenpeace representative on the Bureau recognised their potential value, 
commenting: 
 
They are extremely fashionable now in international and government circles 
and play an increasing role in informing decision makers at this level. They 
certainly do have merits with respect to widening the horizon of participants as 
to how the world may look like in 20 to 50 years time, i.e. beyond the time 
limits of serious predictions.
13
 
 
As he noted in 2005, much was up for grabs, and he argued to his NGO/civil society 
constituency the importance of engaging with the scenario process: 
 
Selecting and nominating ‘broadly forward thinking persons’ who could make 
a critical and constructive impact especially on this last meeting [of the 
scenario group] will be crucial. A lot of the methodology seems to be still 
open to discussion, especially the question what can be seriously modelled by 
computing available quantitative data (see indicators) and which parts should 
be ‘narrative’, i.e. just described in a qualitative manner.14 
 
 Participants from the NGO community argued that the use of quantitative scenario 
models was excluding and narrowing, and not open to rigorous debate by multiple 
stakeholders. They argued that alternative perspectives – including alternative 
quantitative representations – could be offered if the conceptual frame of the scenarios 
had been appropriate to their experience. According to one commentator (personal 
communication, September 2008), they offered ‘twenty-first century critiques of 
twentieth century tools and assumptions’, including offering alternatives based on 
advanced quantitative approaches. By contrast, the original modelling team argued 
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 that, for legitimacy and authority, the use of well-tested models and their scenarios 
was critical, as this gave a grounding that was objective and clear.  
 This division, not surprisingly, has persisted, with the dividing lines often clearly 
drawn between different camps. In the writing groups and in the review process this 
equally became evident. What was rigorous evidence for making a case? Were data 
required or were case studies sufficient? In their attempt to develop an evidence base 
for their arguments from the beginning the NGO community requested readers of the 
website (and numerous listservs supporting a variety of causes) to send in ‘success 
stories’ of sustainable agriculture to expand the ‘grey literature’ source material 
accepted under the IAASTD principles and procedures.
15
 The hope was to influence 
the argument through examples and grounded experience, rather than abstract 
reasoning, quantitative analysis, and the formal literature.   
 How was this debate dealt with in the end? After much debate, the scenarios work 
was dropped from the final chapter outlines. While the final drafts showed echoes of 
this earlier work, a different framing had emerged which rejected the narrow 
assumptions of the proposed scenario models, much to the disappointment and 
annoyance of the scenario group leaders. Many IAASTD participants argued that 
developing scenarios could prove useful, but only if agreement could be achieved on 
the up-front framing. This had been achieved for the MA, but remained highly 
contested for the IAASTD. As one informant (personal communication, September 
2008) put it: ‘It was more than a quantitative versus qualitative exchange . . . . It is a 
pity from my viewpoint that there was not a different groups of people doing the 
scenario work as it could have been done in a different way’. 
 The failure to achieve agreement on the scenarios work highlighted the tensions 
inherent in the process – both between different knowledge framings and different 
practices of knowledge-making. The hope had been that scenarios work would offer a 
focus, bringing diverse contributions together. The intensely contested knowledge 
politics meant this convergence did not happen. The end result is, as many have 
commented, a bit of fudge: what someone described as a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ analysis, with bits of everything mixed up in an ‘unsavoury cocktail’.16 
For some this is the consequence of attempts at consensus when the politics of the 
process are not made explicit and controversies, dissent and debate are not surfaced 
and explicitly addressed – or even identified. For others this is an inevitable outcome 
of an intensive and inclusive deliberation, which unavoidably surfaced political 
sensitivities, but which had to be finally cast in a language that allowed diverse 
governments to sign off on the document.  Yet in the debates around the quantitative 
scenario modelling, dissent and objection were possible and, although untidy, the final 
result, perhaps contrary to initial expectations, was not the one the most powerful 
would have wished. Thus, through the assessment, power relations, conflicting views, 
positions, and interests had to be confronted – from the peer review discussions 
around the scenarios to the fraught scenes at the final plenary when the US delegation 
fought to water down conclusions.  
 
Confronting controversy: GM crops 
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 Perhaps the biggest controversy that dogged the IAASTD process was that 
surrounding GM (and specifically transgenic) crops. When the assessment was being 
proposed in 2002, this was a raging debate particularly in Europe and across NGO 
and civil society groups around the world. While some from mainstream scientific 
institutions and biotechnology corporations dismissed this uproar as a diversion, one 
that was not based on sound understandings of science and one that resulted in the 
undermining of poverty reduction and development by withdrawing new scientific 
and technological opportunities, it was a debate that would not go away.  
 Many in the NGO community feared that the IAASTD was simply going to be a 
front for the backers of GM crops and that the enlistment of NGOs and civil society 
groups under an umbrella of participation and consultation was going to provide an 
illegitimate justification for recommending GM crops be central to future agricultural 
R&D strategies globally. Given the keen interest of some important industry players, 
as well as some major GM advocates within the CGIAR system for example, this was, 
given the timing, probably a justified fear. For example the pro-biotech, industry-
funded website run by the ISAAA argued that the IAASTD would provide a scientific 
assessment of biotech crops, and so perhaps ‘proof’ of their utility (ISAAA 2006).  
 Among the NGO groupings, there was much debate as to whether this was simply 
a process of cooption. The launch of the agassessment-watch website, with regular 
inputs from Greenpeace and PANNA, was an indication of the caution, as were the 
comments made by a number of key players in the international NGO community 
about the IAASTD. For example, in a presentation to the UK’s Department for 
International Development in 2003, Patrick Mulvany of the UK Food Group 
presented a civil society perspective, and, while welcoming the initiative, offered 
some important cautions.
17
 
 Following the report of the steering committee and the subsequent first plenary 
session in Nairobi,
18
 alongside the 30 government representatives, six members of 
NGO/civil society groups had accepted invitations to be on the Bureau of the 
assessment (including Greenpeace International, the Pesticide Action Network, and 
Practical Action), and so were central to the overall governance. But so had 
representatives from ‘industry’ (including Syngenta and Unilever), ‘consumers’ 
(including the Center for Science in the Public Interest and Consumers International), 
‘producers’ (including International Federation of Agricultural Producers and the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements), and ‘institutions’ 
(including the Third World Academy of Sciences, the World Conservation Union 
(IUCN), the CGIAR, and CAB International). This group of 60–30 government, 30 
non-government – was not an easy group to convene, let alone get to agree on 
anything. A co-chair of the assessment reflected, 
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This was a difficult time. No one trusted anyone else. X kept walking out. It 
was very disruptive, and we could not make much progress for a while. We 
had to be patient. The GM issue was a diversion. We had to get down to the 
real issues.
19
 
 
 While the GM debate continued to be discussed, and remained often the ‘elephant 
in the room’, the overall framework and approach of the assessment cast the debate 
much wider. Indeed, by framing the overall debate in relation to broader questions of 
agricultural knowledge, science, and technology (AKST) within a loose framework 
that looked fundamentally at outcomes relating to poverty reduction and 
environmental management, a much larger – some would say poorly focused – 
discussion could take place. This was framed not in terms of whether GM crops are 
somehow ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but what combination of technologies make sense given the 
diverse future requirements of different people’s needs in different parts of the world. 
Thus the overall framing, and the decentralised process, managed, at times, to get 
away from the narrow perspective of the GM debate dominating discussion at that 
time by either firmly pro or anti camps. Debates centred on whether new GM crops 
met the exacting IAASTD goals on the basis of well-documented evidence. The 
challenge, of course, was that much talk of new biotechnology application in 
agriculture, by the science establishment and the corporates alike, is one of prospect 
and promise. The evidence from the field is weak and limited. The argument 
presented is that ‘if only companies are given the freedom to operate, then all sorts of 
panaceas for the world’s ills will be unleashed’. This is countered by the argument 
that current evidence does not stand up to scrutiny, and a highly precautionary stance 
must be applied to future options. Wider questions of corporate control, intellectual 
property and biosafety were also introduced as arguments against a simple 
endorsement of GM crops. A stalemate therefore quickly emerged, with 
fundamentally different framings competing with each other.  
 The sense among Bureau members interviewed was that the GM issue was not the 
one to confront; yet it persisted through the writing and reviewing process with 
attempts by different groups to insert elements of their positions. The final global 
synthesis report ended up quite equivocal and is reflected in the summary which 
states, 
 
A problem-oriented approach to biotechnology R&D would focus investment 
on local priorities identified through participatory and transparent processes, 
and favour multifunctional solutions to local problems. These processes 
require new kinds of support for the public to critically engage in assessments 
of the technical, social, political, cultural, gender, legal, environmental and 
economic impacts of modern biotechnology.
20
 
 
The sub-Saharan Africa summary for decision-makers was even more circumspect: 
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 Genetic engineering is considered by some to have important ramifications for 
productivity, but some of its uses and impacts are hotly contested. 
Contamination of farmer saved seed, and threats to biodiversity in centers of 
origin, are key concerns with respect to biotechnology and genetic engineering 
in particular. The environmental risks and evidence of negative health 
impacts mean that SSA’s [sub-Saharan Africa’s] ability to make informed 
decisions regarding biotechnology research, development, delivery and 
application is critical
21
.  
 
 There are different interpretations (inevitably) of this final outcome. Some view 
this as a fudge, a failure to address the issues; while others view this is a sensible way 
forward, one that parks an unhelpful debate and moves on. Certainly the private sector 
company representatives involved in GM technology found it unacceptable and 
stormed out of the process in late 2007 before the conclusion, provoking a storm of 
controversy, and much frustration among certain writing teams who had been subject 
to foot-dragging delays over months.
22
 A representative of CropLife International, a 
biotech industry umbrella body, indicated that this decision was prompted by ‘the 
inability of its members to get industry perspectives reflected in the draft reports’ 
(Nature 2008). In a clearly heart-felt opinion piece for the New Scientist, Syngenta 
scientist Deborah Keith (2008) explained why she, along with other industry 
representatives, walked out: 
 
Despite our active participation, the draft IAASTD report does not adequately 
represent the contributions of plant science to sustainable agriculture. . . .  
The decision was not taken lightly, given our commitment to agricultural 
development and sustainability. But there was blatant disregard for the 
benefits of existing technologies, and for technology's potential to support 
agriculture's efforts to meet future crop needs. I think this was in part because 
the differences between various participants' perceptions about these 
technologies, and the scientific facts, were not maintained and highlighted. 
Sadly, social science seems to have taken the place of scientific analysis. 
 
 Of course this sort of naive appeal to a particular set of ‘scientific facts’ and a 
dismissal of what she calls ‘social science’ has been typical of many interventions by 
the biotechnology industry over time, but the impasse that this created, with the 
industry lobby unable to countenance a compromise framed by interests other than 
their own, proved a big, and late, stumbling block, allowing certain governments to 
pull back from the process and back their industry lobbies. 
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  Although approved by 57 countries, the final document remained unsigned by the 
US, Canada, and Australia, with the UK, in the end, signing up.
23
 Objections are 
contained in the annexes of the agreed documents. The Canadian government, 
resorting to a similar argument about ‘objectivity’, complained that ‘there remain a 
number of assertions and observations that require more substantial, balanced and 
objective analysis’.24 Many in the NGO community believe that the real reason for the 
reluctance of certain countries to sign up was the pro-GM position of key 
governments and their unwillingness to back a document that, if not explicitly anti-
GM, is certainly not gung-ho in favour.
25
 This is apparent, for example, in the US 
objection noted in the Annex to the Global Summary for Decision Makers: ‘the USA 
does not believe that there is sufficient balance in reflecting the use/range of new 
technologies, including modern biotechnology in Key Findings 10 and 11’.26  
 Despite the failure of some governments to sign up, the conclusion of the final 
plenary session and the majority agreement of the final document by governments 
from across the world was the scene of exuberant celebrations by the NGO grouping 
who had worked so hard to influence the process. The press releases highlighting 
particular passages of the final document emphasising how ‘the old paradigm of 
industrial, energy-intensive and toxic agriculture is a concept of the past. The key 
message of the report is that small-scale farmers and agro-ecological methods provide 
the way forward’.27 In numerous press interviews, you-tube clips, and podcasts, 
Watson himself argued that ‘business as usual is not an option’.28 In an explicit 
attempt to broaden the debate about agriculture beyond production, Executive 
Director of the UN Environment Programme, Achim Steiner, stated at the opening of 
the inter-governmental plenary in April 2008: 
 
Agriculture is not just about putting things in the ground and then harvesting 
them . . . it is increasingly about the social and environmental variables that 
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 will in large part determine the future capacity of agriculture to provide for 
eight or nine billion people in a manner that is sustainable. (Steiner 2008) 
 
 But was this change of tune and the promotion of a integrative, holistic vision 
really local voices finally being heard in the international arena? Was this the genuine 
success of an inclusive, deliberative process? Or was this rather another type of 
selective, global expertise getting the upper hand – through hard work, diligent 
campaigning, and the deployment of alternative forms of elite expertise? The next 
section looks at the interaction between diverse sources of expertise in the IAASTD 
process, and the way such knowledge-making in turn constructs notions of 
citizenship. 
 
Experts and citizens 
The assessment process has seen diverse forms of expertise becoming engaged. What 
has this revealed about the relationships between experts and citizens, and how have 
diverse forms of citizenship been practised in such local to global engagements? NGO 
activists engaging with the IAASTD have laid out some of the challenges. Marcia 
Ishii-Eiteman from PAN North America reflects,
29
 
 
Key to the success of the Assessment, from a civil society viewpoint, will be 
the extent to which it accurately reflects the voices, experiences and priorities 
of small farmers around the world, and provides an analysis of corporate 
industrial agriculture’s failings as a strategy to reduce hunger and improve 
rural livelihoods. This in turn depends upon our abilities as sustainable 
agriculture and social justice movements to put forward authors who will 
critically assess the impacts of powerful public institutions such as the World 
Bank and the World Trade Organization as well as the private sector on the 
generation, access and use of knowledge, science and technology. To the 
extent that the Assessment reflects the knowledge and concerns of small 
farmers, it will provide civil society organizations (CSOs) with an important 
advocacy tool for specific campaigns as well as for the long-term movement 
towards social justice and equitable and sustainable development.  
 
At the same time, as Romeo Quijano, PAN Philippines’ representative on the 
Assessment’s Advisory Bureau, argues:  
 
We must always be acutely conscious of the fact that the balance of forces are 
stacked largely in favour of the dominant corporate model of agriculture. The 
discussions on hunger and poverty hardly go into the realm of power relations 
and the underlying socio-political and economic forces that are major 
determinants of what kinds of AKST (Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology) are generated, distributed, used and accessed and who are the 
main beneficiaries.  
 
. . . a major challenge is how to correctly inject and project the grassroots 
perspective in the Assessment, given the fact that most progressive farmer and 
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 peasant organizations are not participating in this exercise. We should aim for 
maximum articulation and public dissemination of the core issues being 
discussed, and carry out a broad and intensive public awareness campaign on 
the issues being debated. The civil society organizations that are participating 
formally in the Assessment -- as authors and members of the Bureau and 
design teams -- must continuously reach out to peasant groups who are left out 
of the process and strive to reflect their perspectives on the key issues.  
 
 Here an explicit perspective is laid out about how to link local and global 
processes through the intermediation of civil society representatives. The talk is of 
‘injecting grassroots perspectives’ and ‘reaching out to peasant groups’, while at the 
same time quite clearly specifying in advance an agenda about what progressive 
views should be – regarding industrial agriculture, trade regimes, and so on. This, as 
NGO players involved in the assessment admit, is a highly positioned mediation role, 
one that potentially carries much power and influence, and, with it, responsibility. In 
interviews, such individuals argue pragmatically: if we don’t do it, no one will. They 
argue that the choice to engage was strategic, with the aim, as explained above, to use 
the Assessment as a mobilisation tool in the future, to help push forward positions that 
they hold dear, in alliance with the ‘progressive movements’ who had been left out of 
the process, or who had chosen not to engage. The sense that the civil society groups 
were entering an open, deliberative space where rational negotiation of consensus 
would emerge was often far from their conception. This was a highly political setting, 
dominated by powerful groups, deploying powerful methods (like scenario models) 
which can act to undermine alternatives, and they needed to mobilise to deploy some 
form of countervailing power.  
 For many the choice to engage with a mainstream, World Bank-funded 
assessment, where the corporate sector, international research organisations and 
donors had a major role, was a difficult one. For many years – and particularly around 
the GM crops issue – a stance of confrontation had been adopted, with some agrarian 
movements – notably La Via Campesina – consciously avoiding direct interaction, 
and so the dangers of co-option, with formal inter-governmental processes such as 
this. While such movements remained on the outside of the IAASTD, there were 
many connections between movements and NGO players inside the assessment 
process. This presented some tense moments, especially over some of the major 
points of contention discussed earlier, but overall a sense of unity and purpose was 
maintained through a lot of hard work and some highly effective communication 
efforts. The politics of engagement was thus constructed through a continuously 
interacting ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ balancing act. External pressure from campaign 
groups and movements helped keep up the pressure at the same time as persistent 
efforts from within by bureau members, authors, and reviewers sustained internal 
momentum. Although not organised systematically, these interactions proved highly 
effective in keeping the debate open, even in the face of substantial countervailing 
forces from corporate and government players.   
 Getting involved, and nominated as an author or reviewer, was critical. The 
nomination process which took place during 2004 was somewhat opaque, but, 
according to the guidelines, nominations from all key stakeholders – from government 
to industry to NGOs – were possible. With the first call for authors, PANNA in 
particular organised a wide call for people to get involved during mid-2004, both 
through listservs and direct approaches, arguing that the assessment offered an 
important opportunity for civil society engagement and awareness raising around 
 issues of corporate control and agribusiness interests, as well as highlighting the 
potentials for more sustainable forms of agriculture. The review of the drafts was seen 
as another key juncture for a wider civil society engagement. The Greenpeace Bureau 
member sent out a request to a wide network in September 2006. In a widely-
circulated email, he comments,
30
 
 
The production of this first draft was, not surprisingly, a highly contentious 
endeavour, and in some cases chapter authors have not yet agreed 
on the contents or analyses put forth by co-authors. Thus you will find at 
this stage a mix of viewpoints, perspectives, arguments, assumptions and 
types of evidence put forth, as well as some contradictory findings, and a 
massive tension between the more conventional econometric, technocratic and 
production-oriented analyses, and those emphasizing environmental, social 
and political issues such as governance, equity, rights, ecosystem integrity and 
‘services’,  local and indigenous knowledge and rights, and the 
multi-functionality of agriculture. 
 
The primary objective of the first review is to identify main gaps, flaws 
and contradictions in analysis, lack of referral to key bodies of 
literature, and to critique the presentation of controversial issues (e.g. 
impacts of conventional agriculture; the role of transgenic biotechnology in 
achieving ‘sustainability and equitable development’ goals; ‘scientific’ 
basis of policy formation (whose science, whose technology); relevance of 
LEISA [low external input agriculture], organic and alternative agriculture; 
IPR [intellectual property rights], trade, investments, etc.).We hope that 
reviewers will not hesitate to point out flaws in the draft (as well as any 
strengths), as this will be immensely helpful to those of us 
on the inside. 
 
 The issues around which there was an expectation that civil society groups would 
comment was clear – rights, governance, ecosystems, indigenous knowledge, 
organic/alternative agriculture, intellectual property, trade and so on. Through the Ag 
Assessment Watch site, PANNA in a call for ‘real reviewers’ has provided a guide for 
how to respond, offering editorial suggestions as well as requests to provide more 
input on particular themes.
31
  
 In international assessment processes of this sort much of the hard work comes in 
the review and editing process. Here the minutiae of textual differences are discussed, 
and a particular wording and pitch is required. A (perhaps) apocryphal story 
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 suggested that the US government had employed a thousand people in the US 
Department of Agriculture and USAID to go through the final documents, picking up 
sections, paragraphs, even words which their negotiators would dispute in the final 
sessions before any text was agreed. Like UN treaties and conventions, the diplomatic 
process of square-bracketed disagreement and free text agreement was followed. 
Engagement at this level of detail was new for some of the NGO and activist 
participants, usually excluded from formal governmental negotiations, so they had to 
learn the tricks of the trade, and become involved in the fine detail. As one informant 
put it: ‘Our work is unrecognisable in the final version: the odd bit here and there, but 
often not the meaning’.32 Another (personal communication, August 2008) countered: 
‘This is part of the re-shuffling of understanding that is the positive outcome of multi-
stakeholder dialogues and efforts to create something new together’. The internal 
dynamics of author groups was critical, along with the capacity for effective, inclusive 
facilitation.  
 But to what degree does this sort of process allow for the ‘injecting’ of alternative, 
grassroots perspectives from farmers themselves? How does ‘the local’ get 
represented in ‘the global’? And what kinds of knowledge politics emerge? In 
discussions with a variety of participants in the assessment, a number of themes were 
raised.
33
 First, everyone recognised that, because of the way the IAASTD was 
organised, ‘real’ farmers and their organisations did not really get a look in – whether 
at the early consultation stages in the regions (see Scoones 2008 for discussion of the 
Africa case) or subsequently. Some regarded this as a fundamental design flaw of the 
whole process, undermining the legitimacy of the effort as a whole; others saw this as 
a probably necessary consequence of convening such a process, but one which 
allowed space for representation by NGOs and other civil society organisations. For 
some this mediation role was not a problem: these were people who worked on the 
ground in different locations and so could reflect the concerns of farmers on the 
ground. Links between the NGO groups and wider agrarian or environmental 
movements, perhaps with a greater claim to local legitimacy, was often obscure. 
While the individuals involved in the intense writing, reviewing, and lobbying 
processes from NGOs were very much linked into these wider networks, the degree to 
which grassroots movement members engaged directly was limited. For this and other 
reasons, others saw the processes of intermediation and translation as problematic, as 
well as the claims made by NGOs to ‘represent’ others. Some industry and 
government participants, for example, claimed that GM crops were a concern to 
(northern) NGOs, but not farmers from the global south.
34
  
 Second, some participants reflected on their own positionality – both as experts 
and citizens from particular places, and how their origins, ethnicity, gender, and 
experience was intimately bound up with their contributions as experts. As one 
African author, middle class university lecturer in Zimbabwe, trained in the UK, but 
originally from a rural home in a farming area, observed: ‘Yes I am an economist, but 
I also from Africa, and I am a woman. I have lived in these places, and experienced 
the life of farming in a dryland setting’.35  
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  This explicit reflection on positioning was notably more evident among those I 
interviewed from Africa. They were after all involved in a regionally-specific 
contribution, which was by definition located. Others associated more with the global 
assessment and often northern researchers from international organisations 
emphasised their contributions as credentialed experts – as an expert on crop pests or 
forestry or soil and water conservation, for example.  As one participant (personal 
communication, August 2008) put it:  
 
Each of the authors are members of diverse networks, often reaching deep into 
truly ‘local’ communities, through previous field work experiences, and these 
were in my experience often mobilised to review particular paragraphs of draft 
text, clarify the key points of concern, highlight very local experiences and 
generally to raise within the process the issues of evidence, legitimacy and 
accountability. So do not underestimate the multiple flows of communication 
and representation at work! 
 
 Thus everyone acknowledges that their background and life experiences affect 
their contribution as an expert in such a process. Although often professing the 
importance of generalised, universal, global knowledge (say around the impacts of 
climate change) no one I interviewed was very keen to accept the idea that they, as 
participants in the IAASTD, were a global citizen – certainly part of a globally linked 
epistemic community, a network based on a focus on shared expertise and 
contribution to a particular debate, but not strictly an ‘emergent solidarity’ (cf. Ellison 
1997) at a global level which could be talked about in terms of citizenship.
36
  
 Yet, third, many participants of course are quintessentially ‘global’, not easily 
located in one particular place and comfortable and accomplished across them. For 
example, one of the co-chairs is an African, female scientist, educated in the US, head 
of an African research/policy institute and highly well-connected internationally. She 
is deeply committed to making the perspectives of Africa have a voice in the process, 
yet would never claim to be the legitimate voice of peasant Africa. Yet, can such 
people, part of the international research and policy elite, from their acquired 
positions of power and authority offered through their qualifications and expertise, 
provide this, and how, in turn, is their input legitimated?  
 There is of course much politically-correct talk associated with the IAASTD about 
southern perspectives and involvement, but in practice the southerners who get a look 
in are sometimes as elite – in their lifestyles, outlooks, and influences – as many of 
their northern counterparts. Does living behind razor wire in a smart suburb of Harare 
or Nairobi provide special access and insights? Or is this just another, of many 
different, ‘lived citizenships’ that are rather selectively added to the mix? 
 The aim was to involve a more diverse group of expertise than would be usual in a 
conventional approach, with a very conscious effort to be inclusive, but, in the end, it 
was deliberation on the basis of scientific evidence that would be the key. 
Interestingly, this is the view held both by ‘mainstream’ scientists and NGO 
representatives. For the former, ‘good science’ requires rigorous methodologies and 
systematic processes of international peer review, and the Assessment’s design is very 
much in line with this thinking.  
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  There was a strong commitment to the rigorous testing of evidence and, following 
Habermas (1994), the importance of building consensus through multi-stakeholder 
dialogue. Yet, this is not to say that politics, values, and moral positions were not 
discussed, often intensively, during author group meetings. Evidence had to be 
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values, and judgements that go way beyond simple rational science and expertise, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 of the final global report (IAASTD 2009a).  
 Thus, in the discussion of the IAASTD, there is an interesting contradiction in the 
simultaneous talk of engagement and involvement of diverse, multi-stakeholder 
perspectives and its confrontation with the ideal of consensus and an appeal to a 
universalised objectivity of science and expertise: the ultimate global vision. This 
tension was often not addressed and resulted in some underlying challenges of 
knowledge politics and power relations not being confronted, with some major fudges 
resulting. Yet, in a more pragmatic tone, one participant (personal communication, 
August 2008) commented, 
 
Perhaps for the first time, different constituencies had to wrestle with the 
evidence and experiences that inform a point of view. These could no longer 
be dismissed as simply differing ideologies or power gradients. We all had to 
put our trust in the IAASTD principles. The hard part was getting all 
contributors to be accountable to them.  
 
 
The politics of knowledge in global assessments 
So, what does the IAASTD experience suggest for the wider debates about democracy 
and participation in global arenas? The IAASTD reports, as we have seen, as many 
others of a similar ilk, present the bringing together of diverse knowledges as largely 
unproblematic. The emphasis is on neutrality and objectivity. For example, the 
guidelines state, ‘Assessment reports should be neutral with respect to policy, and 
deal objectively with scientific, technical and socio-economic factors . . . .’37  
 But these assumptions are difficult to uphold under closer scrutiny. Further 
questions inevitably arise: whose expertise counts? How are cultural and institutional 
commitments brought into supposedly neutral expert statements and review 
processes? What overt and tacit routines legitimate and validate collective 
knowledge? What happens to other forms of knowledge and expertise – with different 
epistemological and ontological bases? These processes played out in different ways 
in different parts and at different moments in the assessment. Sometimes the 
knowledge encounters were productive and fruitful, challenging participants to reflect 
on assumptions and to include otherwise neglected perspectives. At other times, such 
engagements were less productive, being dominated by particular perspectives and 
interests.  
 While the explicit, formal design of the assessment was rather blind to the 
questions of knowledge politics, in practice in the author groups, the review process, 
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 and the wider discussion around the assessment, there was intense reflection on 
knowledge, its validity, and the nature of expertise. As the examples discussed above 
have shown, contests over knowledge claims and the framing of issues have been very 
important. The end result allowed a plural set of perspectives to emerge, despite 
attempts to constrain the debates. This shows, at one level, a sensitivity of the process 
to such issues. But this was not explicitly part of the formal design, and a key lesson 
has been that such issues of knowledge framing need to be more centrally and 
explicitly considered from the start. 
 A key feature of such assessments is that they are in some way ‘representative’, 
investing as they do in large-scale – and very expensive – consultations. The website 
makes great play of the diversity of actors involved, and the Secretariat includes a 
number of southern researchers, activists, and others. Clearly, simple forms of 
representation – direct or indirect – are impossible at a global level. But how do 
global processes of this sort gain legitimacy for what they do, and how are 
representatives and representation constructed by the organisation itself, its sponsors, 
and the actors involved?  
 As discussed above, the formal process allows for representation by different 
groups according to strict quotas, with non-government and government, NGO, and 
business all careful numerically balanced on the Bureau, for example. As an inter-
governmental process, representation is also via states, with 110 countries involved 
and 30 government representatives from all regions on the Bureau. And in the public 
review process, the web commentary facility allows anyone with access to the 
Internet to have their say. This means representation, and routes to influence the 
process, can happen via multiple routes. The NGO/civil society grouping, for 
example, has been very active in mobilising participants, engaging in debate, and 
tracking the process through a dedicated website. Equally, the US government 
invested substantial resources in the review process, persistently trying to get its view 
across and objecting to alternative framings.  
 The NGO/civil society grouping is seen by the convenors of the assessment as a 
key route through which voices of poorer farmers across the ‘global south’ can have a 
say, thus bringing wider legitimacy to the process and its outcomes. But this is an 
awkward intermediary, bridging position. Some NGO groups argue that, despite the 
fact that they have no formal mandate to represent ‘poor farmers’, this is a legitimate 
role, one based on solid experience and dialogue with people in the field. Yet this 
position clearly comes with much baggage. It is far from neutral. Indeed, there is a 
clear line on many issues, linked to some high-profile, strategic campaigning, 
something that critics see as more reflective of a middle-class, left-leaning, 
European/North American position than the legitimate voice of the masses. In the 
context of the IAASTD, whether on issues around GM crops or industrial agriculture, 
the positions of some NGO groupings have been voluble and consistent, something 
not necessarily reflecting the diverse and often conflicting views of poorer farmers 
across the world. 
 In debates about the role of ‘civil society’ in political processes, this is of course a 
long-running, and probably irresolvable, discussion. As many commentators point 
out, in addition to questions about representation, there remain important tasks in 
encouraging transparency and carrying out monitoring and review of formal processes 
to generate systems of accountability in governance arrangements, particularly at the 
global level.  
 What does this mean for ideas of citizenship, and particularly global citizenship? 
In terms of the forms of engagement with the process, we can see at least three 
 different forms of ‘emergent solidarity’ which might be termed ‘citizenship’ (cf. 
Ellison 1997, Leach and Scoones 2006). First, participants in the process have 
identified with their particular groupings. The NGO/civil society ‘group’ represents 
one set of transnational actors, operating across diverse networks. In this sense, they 
could be described as being part of a ‘global civil society’, and so perhaps global 
citizens. But this is not all. Often the same actors have engaged in other ways: as 
citizens more traditionally defined in relation to the nation state; as experts, part of 
wider ‘epistemic communities’ and associations (Haas 1992); and as cyber-citizens, 
engaging as individuals or groups on Internet discussions and responses through the 
Internet. Are all these engagements the practices of ‘global citizens’, reflective of an 
emergent phenomenon of ‘global citizenship’?  
 Informants, however, were almost universally dismissive of such an idea. The 
vision of global cosmopolitanism was far from their perspective. They self-defined in 
different ways, sometimes in relation to their expertise, sometimes their ethnic origin 
(although often beyond a country level, to the level of a continent, at least for Africa), 
and sometimes as part of a movement or campaign (for sustainable agriculture, 
against GM crops, and so on). Very often, of course, people identified across these 
categories, reflecting on how they would ‘put different hats on’ for different purposes. 
While recognising the importance of engaging in global processes and the important 
influence they have on today’s world, identities remained much more restricted, and 
very often hybrid and complex, rather than the apparently simple ‘global’ assignation 
(cf. Schattle 2008). 
 A key challenge for democratic theory in an era of globalisation is how collective 
perspectives, values and outcomes are negotiated across diverse cultural and 
institutional settings at an international level. Global assessments, such as the 
IAASTD, claim to do this through a process of expert assessment supported by 
stakeholder consultations. But how collective is the ‘collective vision’ that is 
exemplified in the final report? What have been the processes of exclusion, dissent, 
and controversy that lie behind an expert-approved ‘consensus’? What are the 
unwritten codes and practice that shape formal choices and decisions reflected in the 
final report? How have perspectives from particular places, including those drawing 
on more experiential knowledges, interacted with global ones, situated in particular 
centres of power?  
 As we have seen, the final global report, as well as the summary for decision-
makers, has been at pains to include a diversity of views. For some this is a ‘lowest 
common denominator consensus – a 24 hour wonder’;38 for others this is the result of 
effective inclusion, where controversies have been dealt with and compromise sought. 
The formal assessment process did not confront controversy head on, even if the 
micro-processes in author groups and review interactions certainly did. No procedures 
or mechanisms appeared to exist to either surface or deal with such debates and 
divergent views. The elaborate governance structure and procedural arrangements for 
the preparation of the reports created a particular style of public knowledge making. 
This was centred on the principles of inclusion and deliberation, but within severely 
circumscribed limits. A set of institutionalised routines allowed for the involvement of 
different interest groups or ‘stakeholders’; each had particular representation on the 
decision-making body of the Bureau and each was supposed to have equivalent input 
into the expert-led report production and review process, garnering a procedural 
accountability and, so it was hoped, trust and confidence in the authority and 
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 legitimacy of the process. This structured form of representation thus aimed at global 
coverage, covering all bases and creating a comprehensive, all-encompassing 
approach to knowledge making at the global scale.  
 But this formal arrangement was of course also complemented by more informal 
interactions and processes of alliance building and lobbying. As discussed in relation 
to the NGO/civil society grouping (and no doubt replicated among governments and 
private sector ‘interest groups’), there was much manoeuvring to gain access and 
influence. Peer to peer relationships within the Africa writing group too allowed more 
personal connections to be made and informal networks to arise through the process 
which transcended often the ‘interest group’ categorisation of the governance 
structure to create forms of association around the regional, African position vis a vis 
the ‘global’ perspective.   
 This vision of multiple voices being heard in an open deliberative forum at the 
global level is certainly the ideal that many aspire to. In this sense, the IAASTD is 
seen as a potential for the realisation of a global deliberative democratic institution 
that numerous theorists and commentators have argued for (cf. Dryzek 2002) A key 
argument of the IAASTD is that, through engaging multiple stakeholders in an open 
debate about the future, an institutional form will develop, resulting in more robust 
frameworks for policy decision-making. This is an argument put forward by many 
involved in debates about institutional transformation, particularly when dealing with 
scientific debate and public controversy (cf. Miller 2007). 
 The ideal is a ‘reflexive institution’ which is inclusive and deliberative and allows 
multiple, culturally-embedded versions to be discussed, and a collective vision to be 
produced. It allows contrasting framings to be debated, and different political and 
value positions to be acknowledged. It also does not bury uncertainty, controversy, or 
dissent, but makes these explicit in interrogating alternative options (Voss and Kemp 
2006). This is a tough call, especially for disciplinary and professional orientations 
built on particular forms of certainty and expertise, where ambiguity is threatening 
and admitting ignorance is unheard of.  
 Beyond the conceptual discussion of principles, discussion of what a ‘reflexive 
institution’ actually looks like is often vague, and certainly so at a global level. In 
many respects the IAASTD is seen by its proponents as an attempt at creating a 
reflexive institution, although not using this language. Many of the key design 
principles are there – inclusivity, openness, plurality of knowledges, and a 
commitment to democratic processes. But there have been notable limitations. These 
centre on two issues. First, the challenges of confronting uncertainty and controversy, 
and the expectation that these will be resolved by rational, objective, scientific debate 
among expert peers, and, second – and related – the obscuring of the very real 
struggles over knowledge, politics, and values in an attempt to construct the ‘view 
from everywhere’ by seeing this primarily in terms of representation of different 
interest groups. These two gaps , I would argue, have at times created a lack of 
reflexivity in the process; a lack of ability to reflect on positions, framings and 
politics, and so sometimes resulted in an inability to deal with the really tough issues 
and choices confronting the future of science and technology.  
 
Conclusion 
So what should be done? How can the politics of knowledge be made more explicit, 
and negotiations around politics and values be put centre-stage? How can we avoid 
black-boxing issues of uncertainty or more fundamental clashes over interpretation 
 and meaning? And how can processes of participation and engagement become more 
meaningful, democratic and accountable? 
 These are of course big questions at the centre of debates about democratic theory, 
and at the core of the concerns of this book. As Chantal Mouffe (2005) argues in a 
critique of the recent arguments for deliberative forms of democratic practice, there is 
a need to ‘bring politics back in’. In a withering attack of those who believe ‘partisan 
conflicts are a thing of the past and consensus can now be obtained through dialogue’ 
and the assumption that ‘thanks to globalization and the universalization of liberal 
democracy, we can expect a cosmopolitan future’, Mouffe (2005, 1–2) challenges this 
‘post-political’ position: 
 
Such an approach is profoundly mistaken and that, instead of contributing to 
the ‘democratization of democracy’, it is at the origin of many of the problems 
that democratic institutions are currently facing. Notions such as ‘partisan-free 
democracy’, ‘good governance’, ‘global civil society’, ‘cosmopolitan 
sovereignty’, ‘absolute democracy’ – to quote only a few of the currently 
fashionable notions – all partake of a common anti-political vision which 
refuses to acknowledge the antagonistic dimension constitutive of ‘the 
political’. Their aim is the establishment of a world ‘beyond left and right’, 
‘beyond hegemony’, ‘beyond sovereignty’ and ‘beyond antagonism’. Such a 
longing reveals a complete lack of understanding of what is at stake in 
democratic politics and of the dynamics of constitution of political identities 
and, as we shall see, it contributes to exacerbating the antagonistic potential 
existing in society. 
  
 It is this absence of an explicit attention to the political that has been perhaps the 
Achilles heel of the IAASTD. A lack of recognition of antagonistic politics – over 
knowledge, identity and the construction of futures – means that the cosmopolitan, 
deliberative ideal that the IAASTD presents as its model, suppresses, diverts, and 
bottles up such tensions; or at least relegates them to off-the-record debates within 
text-writing and reviewing groups rather than making such issues central and explicit. 
How can this be addressed? On a practical level, a key lesson for the IAASTD – and 
similar assessment processes – is the urgent need inject some systematic reflexivity 
into the process, involving all parties. This is an explicit way of meeting the challenge 
of Mouffe and others of ensuring politics are central. As she argues: 
 
. . . the belief in the possibility of a universal, rational consensus has put 
democratic thinking on the wrong track. Instead of trying to design the 
institutions which, through supposedly ‘impartial’ procedures would reconcile 
conflicting interests and values, the task for democratic theorists and 
politicians should be to envisage the creation of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public 
sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be 
confronted. (Mouffe 2005, 3). 
 
 By highlighting the concept of ‘reflexive institutions’, and the governance 
processes required in this chapter, the challenge is to find ways that such design 
elements can be introduced into the procedures and practices of such assessments in 
ways that allow this type of explicit confrontation of politics, perspectives, values, 
and interests. While the design of the process, its governance, and institutional form 
can be criticised for lack of reflexivity, the behind-the-scenes negotiations over 
 framings, values, and politics have, as we have seen, been heated and continuous. 
However, a key starting point is to make the framing assumptions around diverse 
positions and knowledge claims more explicit: front-stage, not just back-stage. This of 
course does not mean that the examination of scientific issues should not take place; 
instead such reflexivity hopefully results in increased rigour, avoiding the dangers of 
false, fudged ‘consensus’. Opportunities of bringing other actors and voices into such 
processes – including farmers themselves and wider organised movements – need to 
be seized. The politics of intermediation will always be a challenge, as not everyone 
can be at the table, but increasing diversity of debate and inclusivity of process is vital 
for the legitimacy and authority of assessment conclusions. Opening up both the 
inputs and outputs of the assessment process, including an acceptance that consensus 
and agreement may not be appropriate or desirable, can result in more effective, 
rigorous, and more widely accepted outcomes (Stirling 2005).  The IAASTD has been 
an ambitious attempt to create such a space for cross-stakeholder dialogue on a 
critical issue at the global level. Compared to previous efforts at multi-stakeholder 
international assessments it has been more ambitious, more inclusive and more 
effective in many ways. It has inevitably been fraught and flawed, but there have been 
some important lessons learned, some of which have been highlighted by this paper. 
The challenge for the future – as new, different challenges emerge which require 
similar global responses – will be to develop new designs and processes that allow for 
even more effective, inclusive reflexive governance which build firmly on these 
lessons.  
 
 
References 
 
Archibugi, D. 2008. The global commonwealth of citizens: toward cosmopolitan democracy. 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bioscience Reseach Commentary Project. 2008. How the Science Media Failed the IAASTD. 
BSR Commentary, 10 April. Available from: 
http://www.bioscienceresource.org/commentaries/documents/BSRcommentary10.pdf  
Croplife International. 2008. Press Release. Science and technology are key to growing more 
food: CropLife Believes the IAASTD report falls short of goals by overlooking the 
potential of modern plant science. Croplife International. 15 April. Available from: 
http://www.croplife.org/library/attachments/0889ff92-3ffa-41a6-91bd-
9e01fc9993bb/2/2008%2004%2015%20-
%20Science%20and%20Technology%20are%20Key%20to%20Growing%20More%20F
ood.pdf.  
Dryzek, J. 2002. Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contestations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Edwards, M. and J. Gaventa, J. eds. 2001. Citizen global action. Boulder: Lynne Reinner. 
Ellison, N. 1997. Towards a new social politics: citizenship and reflexivity in late modernity. 
Sociology, 31(4), 697–717. 
Fischer, F. 2000. Citizens, experts and the environment: the politics of local knowledge. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Greenpeace 2008. Press release: Urgent changes needed in global farming practices to avoid 
environmental destruction. 15 April.  Available from: http://www.agassessment-
watch.org/docs/greenpeace__15_april.pdf. 
Haas, P. 1992. Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. 
International Organizations, 46, 1-36. 
Habermas, J. 1994. The theory of communicative action: reason and the rationalization of 
society.  Boston: Beacon Press. 
 Haerlin, B. 2005. Report on the 2nd meeting of the IAASTD Bureau in Montpellier, 24–28 
May 2005 [online]. 31 May. Available from: http://agassessment-
watch.org/docs/montpellier_report.pdf. 
Heater, D. 2002. World citizenship: cosmopolitan thinking and its opponents. London: 
Continuum. 
Held, D. and A. McGrew, eds. 2002. Governing globalisation: power, authority and global 
governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
ISAAA 2006. IAASTD to conduct agri-biotech assessment. ISAAA CropBiotech Update, 7 
April. Available from: http://www.isaaa.org/kc. 
IAASTD 2009a. Agriculture at a crossroads. The global report of the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology. Washington DC: Island 
Press. 
IAASTD 2009b. Governance and Management of the IAASTD [online]. IAASTD. Available 
from: http://www.agassessment.org/index.cfm?Page=Governance&ItemID=5. 
Jasanoff, S. and M. Martello. 2004. Introduction: globalization and environmental politics. In: 
S. Jasanoff and M. Martello, eds., Earthly politics: local and global in environmental 
governance. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–29. 
Jiggins, J. 2008. Bridging gulfs to feed the world. New Scientist, 2650, 5 April 2008, pp. 16–
17. 
Keane, J. 2003. Global civil society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Keith, D. 2008. Why I had to walk out of farming talks. New Scientist, 2650, 4 May, pp. 17–
8. 
Latour, B. 1987. Science in action. How to follow scientists and engineers through society. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Leach, M. and I. Scoones. 2006. Mobilising citizens: social movements and the politics of 
knowledge. IDS Working Paper, 276. Brighton: Institute of Develoment Studies. 
Miller, C. 2007. Democratization, international knowledge institutions and global 
governance. Governance, 20(2), 325–57. 
Mitchell, R., et al., eds. 2006. Global environmental assessments: information and influence. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Mouffe, C. 2005. On the political. London: Routledge. 
Nature 2008. Deserting the hungry? Nature, 451, 223–4.   
Nature Biotechnology 2008. Off the rails. Nature Biotechnology, 26, 247.  
Rosegrant, M., et al. 2001. Global food projections to 2020: emerging trends and alternative 
futures. IFPRI 2020 Vision Book. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
Schattle, H. 2008.The practices of global citizenship. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Scoones, I. 2008. Global engagements with global assessments: the case of the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 
(IAASTD). IDS Working Paper, 313. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
Steiner, A. 2008. Opening Remarks by Mr. Achim Steiner at the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) Conference, 
Johannesburg, 7 April 2008. Available from: 
http://www.agassessment.org/docs/IAASTD_Opening_Remarks.pdf. 
Stirling, A. 2005. Opening up or closing down? Analysis, participation and power in the 
social appraisal of technology. In: Leach, M, Scoones, I. and Wynne, B., eds.,  Science 
and citizens: Globalisation and the challenge of engagement. London: Zed Press. 
Stokstad, E. 2008. Duelling visions for a hungry world. Science, 319, 1474–6. 
Tarrow, S. 1994. Power in movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Voss, J and  R. Kemp, eds. 2006. Sustainability and reflexive governance. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
 
Bio 
 
 Ian Scoones is an agricultural ecologist based at the Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex, UK. He is co-director of the ESRC STEPS Centre and 
joint convenor of the Future Agricultures Consortium. His work focuses on the 
politics of policy making in international development, with a particular emphasis on 
agriculture and rural development in Africa. 
 
 
Corresponding author. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 
Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. E-mail: i.scoones@ids.ac.uk  
 
